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MISUNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS
MonroeH. Freedman*
AbbeSmith**
A ModernLegal Ethics:AdversaryEthics in a DemocraticAge. By
New Jersey:
Princeton
Press.2008. Pp. xii,
Daniel Markovits.
University
361.$29.95.
The titleofDanielMarkovits's
book,A ModernLegalEthics?givesthe
it
is
on contemporary
that
a
treatise
comprehensive
lawyers'ethimpression
of thebook,however,
are bothmorelimitedand more
ics.2The contents
treatment
of lawyers'ethics
expansivethanthetitlesuggests.Markovits's
concerns
itselfwithwhathe conceivestobe thepervasive
guiltyconscience
over
their
viciousness"
ofpracticing
lawyers
"professional
(p. 36), andhow
of ... comcan
achieve
a
identity
"worthy
lawyers
guilt-free
professional
in
the
is
to
a powerful
mitment"
Markovits's
book
"articulatje]
(p. 2).
goal
virtue"
one
that
will
"ethical
vindianddistinctively
lawyerly
(p. 2),
provide
lives"(p. 5). Markovits
believesthat,in so
cationof [lawyers']professional
thegenerbeyondlegalethics,concerning
doing,he willalso offer
"insights
state
of
modern
moral
life"
allyfractured
(p. 6).
of a seriousyoungscholar,Markovits's
the efforts
Notwithstanding
bookfallsshort.Ourfocusin thisreviewwillbe on his discussionof the
whichis thesubtitle
andpredominant
ethicsofadversary
advocacy,
partof
thebook.
Markovits
is concerned
withhow a lawyer'sprofessional
lifecan be
ethicallysatisfying
(p. 1). He contendsthatlawyers'livesare not"wellThe sourceof thatguilt,accordingto
lived,"becausetheyfeel guilty.3
is thatlawyersarecompelledto lie andcheat,routinely
andviMarkovits,
ciously(p. 9).
Markovits
whichcombeginshis analysiswiththeadversary
system,
binespartisan
withimpartial
representation
adjudication
(pp. 4, 6-8). He
notesthatthe lawyer'srole in an adversary
systemis client-centered
lawyersare requiredto be loyal to the clientstheyserve.That loyalty
obligesthelawyerto acceptwhattheclientwishesto achievein therepresentation
andto use lawfulandethicalmeansforachieving
clientinterests,
* Professor
of Law, HofstraUniversity;
of Law, Georgetown
VisitingProfessor
University
Law Center.
** Professorof Law and Co-Director,CriminalJusticeClinic and E. Barrett
Prettyman
Law Center.
FellowshipProgram,
Georgetown
University
1.

Daniel Markovits
is a Professor
ofLaw,Yale Law School.

2. Cf. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (1986) (a comprehensive
legal
ethicstreatise).
3. E.g.,pp. 9, 107.
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in particularby maintaining
theclient'spositionagainstany presentor potentialadversary(pp. 15-16, 35).
This simplified,
formalistic
descriptionof thelawyer'srole is fineas far
as it goes. From there,however,Markovitsrelies on erroneousand unsupportedassumptionsregardingthenatureof law practiceand thementaland
emotionalstateof lawyers.The natureof the lawyers'role, he asserts,requires that they violate what everyone,including lawyers themselves,
considermoral conduct.His chief evidence of immorality,
however,is a
and
of
this
definition
of
Because
lyingand cheatlying
cheating.4
peculiar
suffered
as
a
it
is
not
for
a
and
the
result,
lawyerto have
possible
ing,
guilt
self-respect
(pp. 1, 111).
Markovitscontendsfurther
thatthe"adversarysystemexcuse"- thatis,
- cannotsalve thisinevitathelawyer'scriticalrole in an adversarysystem
ble and pervasivesense of guilt.5He says thatfocusingon the lawyer's
adversarialrole mayexcuse such conduct,butit does notdenyits "viciousness" (pp. 106-07). Thus,lawyersremainin a stateof moralself-hatred.
On thismeagerand misleadingfoundation,Markovitsarguesthatlawyers need to "redescribe"theirrole in termsof a distinctiveand new
of ordinarymorality
one thatis consistentwiththe requirements
morality,
termsso thatlawyerscan now call
(p. 150). He achievesthisby redefining
virtuouswhat was previouslyvicious. Thus, loyaltyis recastas "fidelity,"
and "giving
and lying and cheatingas "nonjudgmentalself-effacement"
voice" to thosewho cannotexpressthemselves(pp. 95-96).
will helpjustifytheadFinally,Markovitsarguesthattheseredefinitions
a reasonto accept it as politically
judicatoryprocessby givingparticipants
In short,Markovitsconstructsa guilt-ridden
lawyerout of an
legitimate.6
notionof lyingand cheatingand thenpurportsto save herby
idiosyncratic
spokespersonin an adversary
recastingher role as thatof a self-effacing
systemnow declaredto be legitimate.
Sadly, even afterMarkovits'smakeover,the lawyerremainsdoomed.
froma redefined
Accordingto Markovits,a lawyercan benefit,subjectively,
is isolatedfromthemoraljudgmentof
role onlywhenthelegal community
therestof society.In today's world,however,thatkindof insularityis impossible.Thus, lawyerswill alwaysbe subjectto themoraljudgmentof the
whichcondemnsthemas liarsand cheaters.In theend,
generalcommunity,
the most Markovitscan say for lawyersis thattheyare "tragic villains"
(p. 246; emphasisin original).
notionof lawyers'lyingand cheating.
4. E.g., pp. 9, 36, 111.We disagreewithMarkovits's
text.
See infranotes19-24 andaccompanying
and assessmentof theadversary
5. Pp. 103-08. We disagreewithMarkovits'sdescription
text.
system.See infranotes32-36 andaccompanying
wordsand phrasesor in the
6. Pp. 188-93. Thereis nothingoriginalin thesedescriptive
text.
in theeyesoftheparticipants.
See infranotes51-59 and accompanying
idea oflegitimation
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Markovitswas trainedin philosophybeforeattendinglaw school,7and,
has said, his work "may tell us more about current
as one commentator
trendsin academic moralphilosophythanit tells us about the practiceof
legal ethics."8A significantpart of Markovits'sanalysis invokes Kantian
Most importantly
for our
moral theory,thoughnot always persuasively.9
and
the
human
condiMarkovits
systematically
ignores
"simply
purposes,
what
law
and
law
address."10
is
tion[,which]
practice
As ProfessorGeoffreyHazard notes,Markovits,like severalof his colleagues at Yale and elsewhere,purveystheidea thatthepracticeof law, "as
and itsethicalnorms.... [i]s ethically
itstraditions,
definedby itsfunction,
with
evil."11
We
Hazard thatthisview is notjust inagree
suspect,perhaps
but
to
correct, "demoralizing,"
especially law students.12
The academics to whomHazard refersare ignorantof, or choose to ignore, the realities of law practice, and, particularly,of lawyer-client
As formerChiefJudgeof the D.C. CircuitHarryT. Edwards
relationships.
observesin an earliervolumeof thisjournal,thereis a growingdisjunction
Edwards points to
between legal education and the legal profession.13

fromOxfordin 1999,and hisJ.D.fromYale
7. Markovits
obtainedhis Ph.D. in philosophy
the nextyear.Daniel MarkovitsBiography,
(last
http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/DMarkovits.htm
visitedAug. 11,2009). We willnotbe discussing,
Markovits'sreferences
to Kant
exceptindirectly,
It seems to us a needlessdistraction
in a discussionof his views on law
and otherphilosophers.
viciousness,and his
by lawyersovertheirprofessional
practice,his notionabouttheguiltsuffered
forcopingwiththatguilt.Readersinterested
in criticalcommentary
on thephilosophiprescription
inthebookshouldreadthearticlescitedinfranotes23-25.
cal references
8. Ted Schneyer,The Promiseand the Problematicsof Legal Ethicsfromthe Lawyer's
Pointof View,16 Yale J.L. & Human. 45, 78 (2004) (reviewingDaniel Markovits,
Legal Ethics
fromtheLawyer'sPointofView,15 Yale J.L.& Human.209) (2004)).
9. See Alec Walen,Criticizing
theObligatory
ActsofLawyers:A Responseto Markovits
's
Legal EthicsfromtheLawyer'sPointofView, 16 Yale J.L.& Human. 1,2, 13 n.30 (2004) (writandmisdiagnoses
theproblem"he
"exaggerates
ingthat,in an earlierversionofhisbook,Markovits
nonsense"and "actual[]nonsense").
addresses,andcallingMarkovits's
analysisboth"philosophical
Walen is a professorof philosophywho has a Harvardlaw degree.He is currently
a Research
forPhilosophyand Public Policyand the School of Public Policyat the
Scholarat the Institute
of Maryland.Alec WalenBiography,
University
http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/facstaff/faculty/
Walen.htm
(lastvisitedSept.25, 2009).
10. Geoffrey
C. Hazard,Jr.,Humanity
and theLaw, 16 Yale J.L.& Human. 79, 79 (2004)
Markovits,
supranote8, at 209).
(critiquing
11. Id.; see also Anthony T. Kronman,The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993) (offeringhis view of ethical problemsassociated with modernday
JohnH. Langbein,TheGermanAdvantagein CivilProcedure,52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823,
lawyering);
853-54 (1985) (observingthatAmericanjudges are oftenchosenforreasonsthathave littleto do
withprofessional
teachesat the University
of Californiaat
competence).Hazard,who currently
HastingsSchoolofLaw,previously
taughtatYale.
12. Hazard,supranote10,at 79. We emphasizelaw students
becauseno lawyerwouldtake
of theevilsof law practiceor of lawyers'guiltyconsciences.But
seriouslytheauthor'sdescription
students
whoare assignedthebook mightbe misledintothinking
thatitis an accuratereflection
of
whattheirprofessional
liveswillbe like.
13. HarryT. Edwards,TheGrowing
BetweenLegal Educationand theLegal ProDisjunction
91 Mich. L. Rev. 2191 (1993) [hereinafter
Edwards,Postscript];
fession:A Postscript,
HarryT.
BetweenLegal Educationand theLegal Profession,
91 Mich. L.
Edwards,TheGrowing
Disjunction
Rev. 34 (1992) [hereinafter
Another
to "TheGrowing
Edwards];see also HarryT. Edwards,
Postscript
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"significantcontingentsof 'impractical'scholars . . . who produce[] abto
stractscholarshipthathas littlerelevanceto ... issues" thatare of interest
Edwards
made
these
and
observations
Although
judges
practicinglawyers.14
some years ago, thingshave not gottenbetter.Indeed, legal scholarship
seemsincreasingly
inscrutableand obscure.15
Of course,we understand
thatlegal theoryis essentialto law practice.16
- exalted as momentousor even
What we object to is impracticaltheory
the
real
concerns
of practicinglawyersand
that
is
unrelated
to
meaningful
judges.
Markovits'sprojectis premisedupon the assumptionthatlawyersare
burdenedby guiltbecause theyare compelledto routinelylie and cheat as
In his view,thiscompulsory"vipartof theirprofessionalresponsibilities.17
ciousness" putsethicalburdenson lawyerswho, "forgood reason wish to
conceiveof themselves... as notviciousat air (p. 107; emphasisin original). But Markovits's"evidence" thatlawyersare burdenedby guilt over
theirprofessionalviciousnessis a Catch 22. He arguesthatthefactthatlawyersdenythattheyroutinelylie and cheatis proofof the sense of guiltthat
dominatestheirlives (p. 107).
It is not clear whereMarkovitsgot the notionthatpracticinglawyers
spend theirlives agonizingover (or denying)theirviciousness.Certainly,
DisjunctionBetweenLegal Educationand theLegal Profession",69 Wash. L. Rev. 561 (1994)
a similarproposition
to thatin theMichiganLaw Reviewarticles).
(asserting
14. Edwards,supranote13,at 35.
15. David Hricik& VictoriaS. Salzmann,WhyThereShouldBe FewerArticlesLike This
and Less for Themselves,
38
One: Law Professors
ShouldWriteMorefor Legal Decision-Makers
thanis necesSuffolk U. L. Rev. 761, 766 (2005). Oftenauthorsincludemuchmoreinformation
sary:
arepacked
lawreviewwillnoticethatlawreviewarticles
Evena casualreaderofanAmerican
to otherdisciplines.
The eclecticism
of legal
withmultiple
asidesandsuperfluous
references
theimpulsetowards
andto a certain
extent
academiais, indeed,oneofitsgreatest
strengths,
of lookingat legalconceptsfrommultiple
overinclusion
is just a by-product
perspectives.
movesbeyondecinpresent-day
lawreviewfootnotes
muchofthescholarship
Nevertheless,
lectictooutright
babbling.
BenjaminBarton,The Emperorof Ocean Park:The Quintessenceof Legal Academia,92 Cal. L.
Stephen L. Carter, The Emperorof Ocean Park (2002)). We
Rev. 585, 597 (2004) (reviewing
in legalanalysisto nonlegalsources,a practicethatgoes back
do notmeantocriticizeall references
theworkof behavto theBrandéisbrief.In fact,Freedmanwas thefirstlegal scholarto introduce
and coachingwitnesses.See
ioral psychologists
regardingmemory,in analyzinginterviewing
Monroe H. Freedman,Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System64-69 (1975) [hereinafter
Freedman,Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System].Also,we werethefirstto use behavioral
in gathering
sensitiveinformation.
of confidentiality
studiesin analyzingtheimportance
scientists'
Monroe H. Freedman& Abbe Smith,UnderstandingLawyers' Ethics 138-39 (3d ed. 2004).
noted:
16. As Freedmanpreviously
oflawis thattheory
andpractice
are
aboutthestudyandpractice
Oneofthefascinating
things
- thestudyofthephilosophy
oflaw.Butjurisis essentially
theory
inseparable.
Jurisprudence
For thepracticing
resultsin profound
can determine
lawyer,
ways
practical
prudence
thereis nothing
morepracticalthantheory.
Monroe Freedman,Contracts: An Introduction to Law and Lawyering 214, 217 (2009)
(italicsandbold-facein theoriginal).
17. P. 39 ("I am claimingthatlawyersareprofessionally
obligatedto lie and to cheat,and
notjustthattheywillin practicetendtodo so.") (emphasisin original).
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Noris ittheexperience
ofhundreds
ofpracticing
thatis notourexperience.
has
worked
than
half
with
whom
Freedman
more
a century
during
lawyers
or
or
is it the
as an associate,partner,
co-counsel,
consultant,
supervisor,
of
the
numerous
aid
and
defenders,
public
legal lawyers, clinical
experience
withwhomSmithhasworkedforthepast
law faculty,
andstudents
fellows,
For us and forthecountlessotherswe haveknown,the
quarter
century.18
of
law
has
beenan exhilarating,
and essentially
moral
practice
gratifying,
of
others
and
of
the
ideals
of
our
constitumaintaining
profession serving
tionaldemocracy.19
We knowof no studythatdocuments
widespread
lawyerunhappiness
due to theethicsof law practice.On theotherhand,we are well awareof
- amongassociatesat largelaw firms.20
- evensomeagonizing
unhappiness
we
have
observed
andreadabouthasbeenovertheunreaButtheagonizing
interfered
with
sonabledemandson theirtime,whichhas significantly
life.In addition,
overlyingandcheating
hasnotrelated
anyconcerns
family
- a
butrather
to theinflation
of billablehoursto clients21
to thirdparties,
seriousmatter,
but not whatMarkovitsis concernedabout.Indeed,he

servetheirclients
18. It is impossibleto listall thehappylawyerswe knowwho faithfully
day in anddayout,and forwhomitis a privilegeto do so. Fora tinysample,we offerRalphCathin New York;Paul Conway,a careerpublicdefenderin Philadelphia;W.
cart,a civil practitioner
a criminaldefenselawyerand clinicalteacherwho runstheMississippiInnoTuckerCarrington,
cence Project;LawrenceFox, a corporatelawyerin Philadelphia;Eric Freedman,a constitutional
and resourcefordeathpenaltyand Guanlaw professorin New Yorkand principalcoordinator
tanamolitigation;
a criminaldefenselawyerin Miami;MarshaLevick,cofounder
JoelHirschhorn,
and deputydirectorof theJuvenileLaw Centerin Philadelphia;JudithLevin,a civil rightsand
criminaldefenselawyerin New York;WilliamMontross,a capitaldefenselawyerat theSouthern
CenterforHumanRightsin Atlanta;MichelleRoberts,a civiland criminallawyerin Washington,
in Washington,
D.C.; llene Seidman,a careercivil
D.C.; HubertSchlosberg,a civil practitioner
thefounder
anddirector
of theOhio
lawyerandclinicalteacherin Boston;David Singleton,
poverty
Clive Stafford
and director
of Reprieve,
Justiceand PolicyCenterin Cincinnati;
Smith,thefounder
RobinSteinberg,
thefounder
of theBronx
a London-based
humanrightsorganization;
and director
in Ashland,Oregon;and ChuckWatson,
Defendersin NewYork;RalphTemple,a civilpractitioner
a criminal
defenselawyerinBozeman,Montana.
19. See, e.g.,Freedman& Smith,supranote15,at chs.2-3; Abbe Smith,Case of a Lifetime:A Criminal Defense Lawyer's Story (2008) [hereinafter
Smith,Case of a Lifetime];
27 Ttx. Tech L. Rev. 1131 (1996);
MonroeH. Freedman,
Legal Ethicsfroma JewishPerspective,
Abbe Smith,DefendingDefending:The Case for Unmitigated
Zeal on Behalfof People WhoDo
TerribleThings,28 Hofstra L. Rev. 925 (2000); Abbe Smith,Defendingthe UnpopularDownUnder,30 Melb. U. L. Rev. 495 (2006); Abbe Smith,For TomJoadand TomRobinson:TheMoral
Obligationto DefendthePoor, 1997 Ann. Surv. Am.L. 869 (1997); Abbe Smith,Rosie O'Neill
Goes to Law School: The ClinicalEducationof a SensitiveNew Age Public Defender,28 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1993) [hereinafter
Smith,Rosie O'Neill]; Abbe Smith& WilliamMontross,
The Callingof CriminalDefense,50 Mercer L. Rev. 443 (1999); Abbe Smith,TheDifference
in
it Makes, 11 Wash. U. J.L.& Pol'y 83 (2003); Abbe Smith,
CriminalDefenseand theDifference
Too MuchHeartand NotEnoughHeat: TheShortLifeand FracturedEgo oftheEmpathie,Heroic
37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1203(2004).
PublicDefender,
20. See, e.g.,Douglas Litowitz, The Destruction of Young Lawyers: Beyond One L
(2006); WilliamD. Henderson& David Zaring,YoungAssociatesin Trouble,105 Mich. L. Rev.
Nick Laird, Utterly Monkey (2005), and KermitRoosevelt, In the
1087 (2007) (reviewing
Shadow of the Law (2005)).
2 1. See SusanSaab Fortney,
TheBillableHoursDerby:EmpiricalData on theProblemsand
PressurePoints,33 FordhamUrb.L.J. 171 (2005).
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declinesto talkaboutthe"economicstructure
ofthelegalprospecifically
fession."22
- at leastin comWe are notevencertainthatlawyersare so unhappy
or working
Nonetheless,
parisonto otherprofessionals
peoplegenerally.23
androutinely
Markovits
triesto demonstrate
thatlawyersunhappily
lie and
cheatbyreferring
to variousactivities
thatarecommonin law practiceand
thatmostpracticing
ethical.He offers,
as an imlawyersconsider
perfectly
in
in
However,
portant
example,lawyers"lying" negotiations.
doingso, he
misstates
theComment
to theModelRulesofProfessional
Conduct,
which,
he says,"expressly
that
lie
about
what
their
clicontemplates lawyersmay
entswill acceptto settlea case,"24
and he citesa case in whichhe says,
thata courtdeclinedto discipline
a lawyerfor"puffing"
in neincorrectly,
gotiations.25
The Comment
to ModelRule4.1 does say thatsomemisstatements
of
factareacceptable
as "conventions,"
thatis,as expected
andacceptednorms
ofbehavior
within
a group.Forexample,in thecase of lawyersin negotiathe
kind
of
statement
or convention
thatis referred
to is theuse of
tions,
that
is
understood
the
to
mean
language
clearly
by
participants
something
otherthantheliteralmeaning
ofthewordsthatareused.Thus,ifLawyerD
saysthathisclientis willingtopay$100,000andnota pennymore,Lawyer
P is notexpectedto takethestatement
anddoes notdo so. Rather,
literally
D
sheunderstands
wouldliketokeepthe
Lawyer tomeanthatthedefendant
settlement
as closeto $100,000as possible,butthatLawyerD intends
that
nottheend,of thenegotiations.
figureto be thebeginning,
Accordingly,
whenLawyerP responds
thatherclientis determined
to go to trialunless
thesettlement
is atleast$180,000,bothlawyers
understand
thattheultimate
willprobably
settlement
be approximately
$140,000,giveortake$5,000or
a lie,muchless "vicious,"is sim$10,000.To call eitherlawyer'sposturing
plysilly.
Markovits
criticizes
as "lies"when
Similarly,
lawyers'legalarguments
thinkareincorrect
theytrytopersuadecourtstorulein waystheyprivately
(p. 53). He saysthatunlikejudgesandjurieswhodispassionately
applythe
addressesthisquestionin a footnote
22. P. 2 n*. Markovits
only.In thesamenote,he writes
that"insofaras it is immoralforlawyersto sell theirservicesto thehighestbidders,thiswrongis
role."Id. AnotheragonizingmatterMarkovitsfailsto
incidental... to the lawyer'sprofessional
who is giventoo littletimeand too fewresourcesto
recognizeis theplightof thepublicdefender
to hisor herclients,butwhonevertheless
givesthefalseappearanceof
giveadequaterepresentation
An EthicalManifesto
effective
See MonroeH. Freedman,
for Public Defenders,39
representation.
Val. U. L. Rev. 911 (2005).
23. See JohnP. Heinz et al., Lawyersand TheirDiscontents:
Findings
froma Surveyof the
thanotherprofessionthatlawyersarenotunhappier
ChicagoBar, 74 Ind. L.J.735 (1999) (finding
als).
24. P. 55 (citingModel Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 4.1 cmt.1 (2003)).
25. Id. (citingRobertsv. Sears,Roebuck& Co., 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1978)). The case
involvesnegotiations
betweentwolawyerson behalfoftheirclients.One lawyerwas accusedbythe
in theopinionto "puffing,"
no referotherpartyof havingcommitted
fraud.Thereis no reference
to whether
the
ence to a requestfordisciplinary
actionby anyoneon anybasis, and no reference
courteitherimposedordeclinedto imposedisciplineon thelawyer.
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law to factsin an effort
to determine
a "trueaccountofthefactsofa case,"
advocates
.
.
.
boththefactsandthelaw
adversary
"aggressively manipulate
and"promote
tosuittheirclients'purposes"
[false]beliefsinothers"
(p. 3).
thatinourownpractice,
We shouldnotefirst
we haveoftenarguedfora
resultthatwe wouldhaveadoptedas a judge.Thisis partly
theresultofour
choiceofpractice
areaandclientsandpartly
theresultofsoundtactics.
Butevenifwe do not"privately
believe"in a particular
case theory
or
few
advocates
to
be
a
view
of
the
argument, judgesexpect
stating personal
factsorlaw.Theyunderstand
thatwe areengagedinadvocacy.Bothlawyer
andjudgeunderstand
thatthelawyeris saying,in effect,
"YourHonor,this
is thewayyoucan renderan objectively
soundand reasonable
judgment
thatfavorsmyclient."Thatis a serviceto thecourt(whichis freeto adopt
theargument
ornot)as wellas to theclient.To call thiskindofadvocacya
much
less
lie,
vicious,is,again,silly.
Halfa century
Lon Fulleranalogizeda lawyer's
ago,legalphilosopher
in
court
to
a
baseball
catcher
withthepitch"and"pulling"
argument
"riding
a pitchintothestrikezone.26
As is trueof Markovits's
fanciedlyingand
it
is
fatuous
to
think
of
catchers
as lyingandcheating
cheating
bylawyers,
whentheypullpitches,
orbaserunners
as beingdishonest
whenthey"steal"
whentheythrowa change-up.
as deceitful
Theseare all
bases,or pitchers
tacticsthatareanalogousto lawyers'conductthatis "permitted
bythelaw
andtheDisciplinary
Rules"27
andthatareexpected,
andrespected
accepted,
bythoseengagedintheparticular
undertaking.
thecontext
ofone'sactionsis critical.
like
therefore,
Clearly,
Inevitably,
scholarsbeforehim,Markovits
otherimpractical
identifies
thesourceof
in roledifferentiation,
whathe sees as lawyers'pervasiveimmorality
speAs he explains,
cificallyin the lawyers'role in our adversary
system.28
do, and indeedare oftenrequiredto do,
adversary
lawyers"commonly
which,ifdonebyordinary
thingsin theirprofessional
capacities,
peoplein
wouldbe straightforwardly
immoral."29
circumstances,
Thus,Marordinary
kovitsrepeatedly
criticizeswhathas come to be called "the adversary
26. See RichardArmour,The Ethicsof Subterfuge,
Sports Illustrated, Oct. 26, 1959
(reportingclass discussion at HarvardLaw School led by ProfessorFuller that analyzed
the ethicsof variousformsof sportssubterfuge),
available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
All Yours,Professors,Sports Illustrated,
vault/article/magazine/MAG1134168/3/index.htm;
Nov. 9, 1959 (includingdialoguebetweenProfessors
Lon Fullerand Yale Kamisarregarding
the
meritsof Fuller'sviews on sportssubterfuge),
available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/
AG1134123/1/index.htm.
article/magazine/M
27. Model Code of Prof'l ResponsibilityDR 7-101 (1980); see also MonroeH. FreedWritten
man,HenryLordBrougham,
byHimself19 Geo. J.Legal Ethics 1213, 1213 n.6 (2006)
on a lawyer'szealous representation
ofa client).
(notingethicalrestrictions
28. See generallyGeraldJ.Postema,Moral Responsibility
in Professional
Ethics,55 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 63 (1980) (arguingthatlawyersshouldnot attemptto separatetheirprofessionalmoral
judgmentsfromtheirpersonalmoraljudgments);RichardWasserstrom,
LawyersAs Professionals:
SomeMoralIssues,5 Hum.Rts. 1 (1975) (analyzingtwopervasivemoralcriticisms
of lawyers).
notesthatadversary
29. Pp. 1-2. Markovits
is notrestricted
to advocates
correctly
lawyering
in courtrooms,
butis thefunction
of all lawyerswho serveclientsand mustanticipatethepotential
foradversarial
challengeto theirworkproduct.Pp. 15-16; see also Freedman& Smith,supranote
15,at 72.
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systemexcuse" (pp. 6-9, 103-08, 156-58). As is typicalof such critics,
however,Markovitsfailsto do justice to that"excuse,"or to whatwe prefer
to call the moraljustificationof the lawyer'srole in our constitutionalized
adversarysystem.30
Markovitshas almostnothingpositiveto say abouttheadversarysystem
or those who believe in it. He offersa crampedand nearlyincoherentdein favorof adversarialadvocacy:
scriptionof theargument
[A]ggressively
partisan
lawyers
playan essential
partinan impartially
justified
divisionofmorallabor.Although
lawyers
mayappearimpermissibly
to favortheirclientsoverothers,
a broaderviewrevealsthatcompetition
and indeedalmostexcluadvocatesconcerned
amongpartisan
primarily,
fortheir
clientsproduces,
onbalance,thebestjusticeforall.31
sively,
He adds thatdefendersof the adversarysystemare "simplistic"and outdated thinkerswho fail to see that their view of things has been
in retreat"(p. 105).
"increasingly
Nowherein 253 pages of textdoes Markovitsprovidea trulypositiveassessmentof the adversarysystem(pp. 6-9, 103-08, 156-58). Nor does he
explainwhatmightbe meantby "thebestjustice forall" in theone description he provides. As a result, he fails to give his readers anything
of theadversarysystem,whichis theessenapproachinga fairpresentation
in
the
role
theUnitedStates.
tialcontextof
lawyer's
- what
We countourselvesamongthedefendersof theadversarysystem
Our own book on legal ethMarkovitscorrectlycalls the "traditionalists."32
ics, UnderstandingLawyers Ethics,33presentsa systematicposition on
lawyers'ethicsrootedin theBill of Rightsand in theautonomyand dignity
view of the
of the individual,and reflectingthe traditionalclient-centered
lawyer'srolein an adversarysystem.34
In ourbook,we explainthattheadversarysystemhas been constitutionalized in this countryby a panoply of fundamentalrightsthat were
incorporatedinto the First,Fourth,Fifth,Sixth, Seventh,and Fourteenth
30. See Freedman & Smith,supranote 15, at chs. 1-2. The "adversary
systemexcuse"is
coinedbyProfessor
The phrasewas first
usedpejoratively
Luban,whodoes notshare
byMarkovits.
ofadversarial
Markovits's
wholesalecriticism
advocacy.See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice:
An Ethical Study 50-66 (1988); David Luban, The AdversarySystemExcuse, in The Good
Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 83, 83-122 (David Lubaned., 1983).
versionof Alan Dershowitz'sfamousdescription
31. Pp. 6-7. Perhapsthisis a postmodern
of the adversarysystemproducinga sortof "roughjustice."Alan M. Dershowitz, The Best
Defense xviii(1982).
thetraditionalists.
P. 8 (citingMonroe H. Freeduses Freedmanto represent
32. Markovits
man, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (1975)). We refer to ourselves as
Freedman& Smith,supranote15,at vii.
"traditionalists."
33.
2010.

editionofthisbookis due to comeoutin
Freedman& Smith,supranote15.The fourth

34. Id. at vii. Markovitsdoes notcitethisbook or its earliereditionsgoingback to 1990.
However,he does cite an articlethatFreedmanwroteforty-four
yearsago and a book he wrote
thirty-five
yearsago. Pp. 258 n.32,264 n.64,266 n.10 (citingMonroeH. Freedman,Professional
of the CriminalDefenseLawyer:The ThreeHardestQuestions,64 Mich. L. Rev.
Responsibility
1469(1966)); pp. 257 n.14,266 n.10,320 n.95(citingFreedman,supranote32).
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Amendments
to theConstitution,
and thathave been elaboratedupon by the
We also explain thatthose constituCourt
history.35
Supreme
throughout
tional values express the deeply moral ideals of individualdignityand
autonomy,and serve to safeguardindividuallibertiesagainst oppressive
government
power.36
In addition,we argue thatthe adversarysystemis the most effective
means of determining
the truth,particularly
in cases in which factsare in
We
out
that
also
the
dispute.37
point
adversarysystemhas historicallybeen
an effectivemethodforpeacefullyresolvingdisputes,includingthosecomwe explain thatthe
Further,
ing fromseriouspoliticaland racial discord.38
in
reflects
a
belief
democratic
decision
adversarysystem
makingthrough
thejury system,and in the importanceof givingindividualscontrolover
theircases, whichgives thema greatersense of havingbeen treatedfairly
and helpsto legitimizethesystemgenerally.39
We will notrepeatthesefairlylengthydiscussionshere.But we wantto
stateclearlythatthereare compellingreasons for a principledperson to
choose to be a lawyerand to carryout herprofessionalresponsibilities
with
a sense of moralconvictionand personalgratification.40
There is an additionalaspect of the lawyer'srelationshipto her client
thatbears heavily on her moral responsibilitiesand which is ignoredby
Markovitsand otherscholarswho criticizeclient-centered
lawyering.
When a lawyerchooses to representa client,41
she necessarilybecomes
theclient'sfiduciary.42
SupremeCourtJusticeBenjaminCardozo explained
theobligationof a fiduciary
thisway:
ofconductpermissible
in a workaday
worldforthoseacting
Manyforms
at arm'slength,
areforbidden
to thoseboundbyfiduciary
ties.A trustee
is
heldtosomething
stricter
thanthemoralsofthemarket
place.Nothonesty
is thenthestandard
alone,butthepunctilio
ofan honorthemostsensitive,
35.
36.

Freedman& Smith,supranote15,at 13.
Id. at 13, 15-30,39-^0.

37.

Id. at 30-39.

Id. at 20-26; see also infranote43 andaccompanying
text.
39. Freedman & Smith,supra note 15, at 39^2. Markovits'sdiscussionof democratic
tack fromours. We believe thatclient-centered
adversarial
theory,
pp. 178-84, takesa different
withdemocratic
butfurthers
it.
advocacyis notonlyconsistent
theory,
38.

40. Markovits
seemsto sharethispointof viewin hisdiscussionofdemocracy,
adjudication,
and adversary
and
advocacy.See pp. 178-208. But thisdiscussionis tentative,
vague,incomplete,
notterribly
cannot,as I have emphasizedfromthe
original.He concludes,"thepoliticalargument
aboutlegitimacy
therefore
start,sustainthejusticeof adversary
adjudication. . . and theargument
cannotdefendadversary
ofimpartial
P. 210.
advocacyto thesatisfaction
morality."
41. The situationsin whicha lawyeris requiredto represent
a clientagainstthe lawyer's
wishesare extremely
rare.See Freedman & Smith,supra note 15, at 72-75 (discussing"Moral
in ChoosingClients").Also, a lawyeris permitted
to withdraw
as longas doingso
Accountability
wouldnotcause materialharmto theclient,and thelawyerwouldbe requiredto withdraw
if the
Model Rules of
lawyer'sobjectionswereso strongas to createa riskofineffective
representation.
Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(b)(l) (1983).
42. Markovits
mentions
theword"fiduciary"
reference.
P. 260 n.28
onlyonce,in a footnote
(citingRestatement(Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006)).
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As to thistherehas developeda tradition
thatis unbending
of behavior.
hasbeentheattitude
andinveterate.
ofcourtsof
Uncompromising
rigidity
when
to
undermine
the
rule
undivided
of
loyalty
bythe
equity
petitioned
erosion"ofparticular
"disintegrating
exceptions.43
to make the client'scause her
Thus, the lawyerassumes the responsibility
own and to carryout theclient'slawfulobjectivesby all lawfuland ethical
means thatare reasonablyavailable. In thisway,the lawyerhonorsthe client's statusas a freepersonin a freesociety,respectstheclient'sdignityas
an individual,and assiststheclientin exercisinghis or herautonomy.
Of course,a lawyermay simplydecline a particularrepresentation,
and
the lawyer'spower to do thatis quite broad.44If a lawyerdoes choose to
a client,however,theonlyway forthelawyerto avoid herresponrepresent
sibilityas a fiduciaryis to put the clienton notice thatshe will limitthe
However,thatabilityis properlyrestricted
scope of the representation.
by
Model Rule 1.2(c), whichpermitsa lawyerto limitthe representation,
but
only to an extentthat is reasonable and if the client consents.This, of
course,is only fairto membersof the public,who properlyassume thata
lawyerwill in factdefendand advance theirinterestsin all aspects of the
and who relyon thatassumption.Moreover,as a practicalmatundertaking
ter,it is therareclientwho is willingto accept less thana fullcommitment
froma lawyer.
- expressly
Whatthismeansis thatthelawyerwill have made a promise
or impliedlygivenherwordupon whichtheclientcan be expectedto relythatshe will use all lawfuland ethicalmeansthatare reasonablyavailableto
advance the client's lawful interestsin all aspects of the representation.
Promises,of course, are generallyrecognizedas among the heaviest of
moralobligations.For ImmanuelKant,forexample,keepingpromisesis a
moral imperative.45
It is interesting,
thatMarkovits,along with
therefore,
theirclients,
otherscholarswho criticizelawyersforzealouslyrepresenting
the
the
moral
and
ethical
of
lawyer'spromiseto thecliimperative
ignores
entand theclient'srelianceon thatpromise.
Markovits,perhapsmorethanothercriticsof zealous advocacy,seems
He says thathe is interested
to findadvocacyitselfdistasteful.46
onlyin what
43. Meinhardv. Salmon,164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo,C.J.) (citingWendtv.
Fischer,154 N.E. 303 (N.Y. 1926)) (involvinga businessmandescribedas a "jointadventurer,"
rather
thana lawyer)(emphasisadded).
in
44. See Freedman & Smith,supra note 15, at 72-75 (discussingmoralaccountability
choosingclients).
45. Immanuel Kant, Theoryof Ethics,in Kant Selections 268, 310 (TheodoreMeyer
Greeneed., 1929); see also Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 202 (C.B. Macphersoned., Penguin
of
Books 1968) (1651) ("Butwhena Covenantis made,thentobreakitis Unjust:Andthedefinition
Injustice, is no otherthanthenotPerformance
ofCovenant");JohnLocke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 27 (GeorgeRoutledgeand Sons Ltd. 1909) (1690) ("Justice,and
is thatwhichmostmenseemtoagreein.").
keepingofcontracts,
- forexample,putting
forward
46. Othercriticstendto focuson lawyers'conductat trials
on perjurious
witnessesto suggesttheyare lying,putting
truthful
"false"theories,
cross-examining
and arguingall of theaboveat closing.See, e.g.,HarryI. Subin,The CriminalLawyer's
witnesses,
on the "Right"to Presenta False Case, 1 Geo. J.Legal Ethics
Mission":Reflections
"Different
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it is like "ethically... to practicelaw withan adversaryadvocate's profesand thathe is notaddressingtheissue "emotionallyor
sionalcommitments,"
6;
psychologically"(p. footnotesomitted).However,thereis morethanethics in Markovits'scentralconcern with lawyers' guiltyconsciences over
adversaryadvocacy.Moreover,it is a concernthatis notsharedby themany
lawyerswho have foughtpassionatelyforanotherpersonin need or in trouble, fora cause thatis dear,or fora principlethatis cherished.
Markovitseschews including"sensational"cases in his book as better
"suitedto casuistry"(p. 20). But some real life cases would have helped
groundthediscussion.For example,Markovitsmakes all sortsof assertions
- such as "professionaldetachment"is more
about criminallaw practice
in
a
criminal
context(p. 82), and lawyersrespectcivil
abandoned
readily
clientsmorethancriminalones (p. 84)- thatseem to come fromnowhere.
Markovitsmighthave ponderedzeal in the defenseof one who has been
accused or convictedin a timeof numerousDNA exonerations,47
wrongfully
As one Guantanamodefense
or zeal in defenseof Guantanamodetainees.48
lawyerhas written:
I nowappreciate
notonlythetenuousness
ofourrepublic
butalso thespeifitis
ourconstitutional
cial rolethatlawyersplayin maintaining
system
and discouraging
as
... As frustrating,
to be maintained.
disappointing,
... tofight
forour
thisexperience
hasbeen,I wouldagaindropeverything
. . . That [request]in 2005 [fordefenselawyersto
fundamental
rights.
serveat Guantanamo]
changedmylife,and I hopealongthewayI can
changethelivesofothersaroundme.Whoknows,maybenexttimeI will
be theonesending
outthe[request].49
Althoughothercriticsthinkthe"adversaryexcuse" is mostjustifiedin a
Markovitsbarelydiscusses criminaldefense,explaining
criminalcontext,50
doesn'tconfinehis criticism
to "deceivingtribunals."
125 (1987). But Markovits
Pp. 48-54. He is
draftdiscovery,
negotiation,
equallyconcernedwithlawyers"lyingand cheating"in investigation,
andsettlement.
ingoflegaldocuments,
Pp. 57-66.
47. As thisreviewgoes to print,244 peoplehavebeenexonerated
by DNA evidencein the
United States. InnocenceProject,http://www.innocenceproject.org/know
(last visited Oct. 16,
to freea wrongly
convictedprisoner,
see
2009). Foran accountbyone of theauthorsof herefforts
Smith,Case of a Lifetime,supranote19.
48. For two excellentbooks featuring
accountsof defendingGuantanamodefirst-person
tainees,see JosephMargulies, Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power (2006);
Clive Stafford Smith,Eight O'Clock Ferry to the Windward Side: Seeking Justice in
of a deGuantanamo Bay (2007). For an articleabouta military
defenselawyer'srepresentation
Zealous LawyeringSucceedsAgainstAll Odds: Major Moriand the
tainee,see EllenYaroshefsky,
Legal TeamforDavid Hicksat GuantanamoBay, 13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 469 (2008) (re- and ultimatelysuccessful
- effortsto free
countingMajor Michael Dan Mori's extraordinary
AustraliannationalDavid Hicks). Disclosure:Freedmanwas a consultant
forMajor Mori,Clive
Stafford
defenselawyers.
Smith,andotherGuantanamo
49. H. Candace Gorman,My ExperiencesRepresenting
a GuantanamoDetainee, Litig.,
Spring2009,at 10, 16.
50. See e.g., David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 58-66 (1988);
David Luban,TheAdversary
SystemExcuse,in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics (David Luban ed., 1983); Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice:
Reformingthe Legal Profession 49-80 (2000); David Luban,Are CriminalDefendersDifferent?,91 Mich. L. Rev. 1729, 1762-63 (1993); see also William H. Simon,The Practice of
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that"[t]he distinctiveness
of thecriminalcontextshouldnotbe overstated"
84
n.
*).
(p.
in lawyeringseemsto be whatMarkovitsis after;restraint
and a
Restraint
shouldn't
be
so
kindof purity.
should
be
more
dignified,
they
aggresLawyers
of their
sive, and theyshouldbe absolutelyconvincedof the righteousness
cause. Yet, in our experience,the verypeople who claim to disdainzealous
seekexactlythatwhentheyor a lovedone needsa lawyer.
lawyering
Markovits'sprofessedultimategoal is to rescuelawyersfromthepervasive sense of guilt thathe has conjuredup. He tells his readershe truly
believesin lawyers,he's on theirside, and his "sympathieslie withlawyers
ratherthanwiththeirdetractors"
(p. 5). To save them,he offersa "redefinirole-based
tion"of thelawyer'srole- whathe calls an "integrity-preserving
in
he
"involves
the
context
which the
says,
redescription"(p. 223). This,
resortto role arises" (p. 166; emphasis in original). But this redefinition/redescription
provesto be merelyword-play,ratherthanany seriousor
of theadversarysystemor practiceof law.51
insightful
reconception
His redefinition
consists largelyof replacingthe word "loyalty"with
We would not quarrelwiththis,since Freedmanused the word
"fidelity."52
in
yearsago whenhe draftedtheAmerfidelity place of loyaltytwenty-nine
and
Smith identifiedfidelityas the
ican Lawyer's Code of Conduct,53
"governingvirtue"forthe criminaldefenselawyerin an articleshe wrote
to see how thiscould help dissiit is difficult
tenyearsago.54Nevertheless,
pateMarkovits'swidespreadlawyerlyguilt.

Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 187-94 (1998) (conceding that adversarial advocacy is
justified in criminaldefense in view of "excessive and discriminatorycriminalpunishment").
A brief word about style. Markovits is given to considerable repetitionand turgidlan51.
guage. There are too many examples to note themall. At one point,Markovits states:
The modernhegemonyof impartialistmoral ideas has thereforegiven rise to a new and distinctiveform of subjugation,associated with understandingmoralitysolely in terms of
- as an externalforce in one's
sacrificingoneself to satisfyburdensomeduties owed others
life,to whichone mustsubmit.It has also engendereda distinctiveformof alienation,associated with identifying
guilt as the principalmoral motive. Both difficultiesare dramatically
theprimevirtueof action.
calls formakingauthenticity
articulatedin existentialist
P. 110 (emphasis in original) (footnoteomitted). At anotherpoint, Markovits states, "[I]t should be
possible ... to reorientrole-insularityso thatit does not compete with impartialmoralitybut rather
gives one cultural and institutionalexpression (among many) to the need for boundedly rational
beings to engage impartial morality throughthe mediation of contingentand particular commitments."P. 253.
52.

Markovits illustratesthisposition as follows:

- therequirement
thatadversary
theprincipleof professionaldetachment
Perhapssurprisingly,
advocates withdrawfromtheirown judgmentsof theirclients' cases- may itselfbe recastas a
- quite
lawyerlyvirtue,whichI shall call fidelity.Fidelityis a complex virtue
characteristically
to achieve.
fromloyaltysimpliciterand itscognatesand muchmoredifficult
different
P. 90 (emphasis in original) (footnoteomitted).
53.
See The Roscoe Pound-Am. Trial Lawyers Found., The American Lawyer's Code
of Conduct 201 (Public Discussion Draft 1980) (including a chapter entitled "Fidelity to the Client's Interests").
54.

Smith & Montross,supra note 19, at 5 15.
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theawkward
Markovits
also offers
as a roleredescription
phrase"negaMarkovits
tivecapablecommitment."55
explainsthisas thelawyerserving
shedoes
an argument
theroleofmouthpiece.
Thus,whena lawyer"presents
whichis
notpersonally
sheproceedsnotas liarbutas mouthpiece,
believef,]
to
articulate
consistent
withhernegatively
commitment
accurately
capable
thanto determine
whatshe (privately)
thinksis
whatclientsclaimrather
true"(p. 165).
said muchthe
Again,we wouldnotarguewiththis,becauseFreedman
us
it
when
he
"Let
samethirty-four
wrote,
say plainly:a lawyeris
yearsago
functions
inthesensethatoneofthelawyer'smostimportant
a mouthpiece
in themostpersuasive
is to speakfortheclient'sinterest
waypossible."56
written
aboutlawyersproviding
a "voice"for
Also, Smithhas repeatedly
to
tosee thisas a revelation
calculated
theirclients.57
Butagain,itis difficult
Markovits's
idea
of
professional
guilt.
pervasive
assuage
Markovits
saysthatlawyersservea politicalfunction
by legitiFinally,
of disputes.58
mizinga legalprocessthatresultsin thepeacefulresolution
thelegalsystem,
Onceagain,we agree.As we havesaid,"[SJociety,
through
and
into
nonof people
channelsthegrievances
groups sociallycontrolled,
an
We thelawyers play indispensaviolentmeansofdisputeresolution.
social process."59
thesefamiliar
ble partin thatconstructive
By repeating
Markovits
claimsto haveachievedhis
themesas iftheywerenewinsights,
Thus,"By embedding
lawyersfromtheirownviciousness.
goalofrescuing
in a politicalcon(withitsattendant
fidelity
negative
capability)
lawyerly
text,thisapproachachievestwo successesforlawyers'ethicsthathave
thatsoundin moremained
beyondthegraspofmoretraditional
arguments
theadversary
systemexcusefor
ralityanddevelop,in one wayor another,
lawyering"
(p. 208).
partisan
fortheprofession
is notthat
Butno. Markovits's
"positiveconclusion"
of individual
liberties
whoservetheessential
lawyersareheroicdefenders
ina constitutional
ofmaintaining
and
function
individual
democracy
dignity
is thathisargument
"hastheformof
autonomy
(p. 12). His finaljudgment
andthatlawyers
inoriginal).
aretragicvillains"(p. 246; emphasis
tragedy,
We disagree.Although
thepracticeof law has its shareof tragedy
whether
due to randommisfortune
or pervasiveinjustice it is ultimately
andgratifying.
We knowwe arenotalonein thisconviction.
This
uplifting
is notthetimetodiscourage
fromthezeallawyersandprospective
lawyers
of law.On thecontrary,
therehas neverbeena
ous,client-centered
practice
55. P. 165. Markovits
elaborateson thisnotionfurther:
"[J]ustas poeticnegativecapability
and promotesaccommodation
beliefs,so
imagination
preservestheintellectual
amonginconsistent
lawyerlynegativecapabilitypreservesthe practicalimaginationand promotesaccommodation
interests."
P. 166.
amongincompatible
56. Freedman,Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System,supranote15,at 12 (emphasis inoriginal).
See, e.g.,Smith,Rosie O'Neill,supranote19.
58. P. 208. However,Markovits
does notreferto theessentialpoliticalfunction
ofprotecting
individual
liberties
againstgovernmental
power.
59. Freedman& Smith,supranote19,at 19.
57.
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needforlawyers
individual
liberties
andhuman
greater
willingtochampion
rights.
Whatmakeslawyersunhappyis not Markovits's
fictitious
"vicious"
Whatmakeslawyers
is bookslikethisone.
lawyer.
unhappy
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